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Several categories of non-market value have been identified for forests and
other natural environments: use value, option value, altruism, bequest value,
existence value and intrinsic value. In this paper, we view these values from a
psychological perspective. Non-market values arise because natural resources
play important roles in furthering human goals. This goal perspective contrasts
with intrinsic value—the idea that natural objects have value as ends in
themselves regardless of their relationship to man. Because of the lack of
precise definitions, elements of intrinsic value are often mixed with existence
value, creating confusion in the literature. These resource values need to be
examined on a logical as well as an empirical basis. We argue that careful
scrutiny reveals problems with both existence value and intrinsic value so that
it is important to question their role in policy formation and analysis.
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1. Introduction
Values occupy a central place in natural resources management. Although forests and
other natural environments are capable of producing benefits for society, not all such
benefits can be maximized concurrently. When trade-offs involve difficult choices, public
policy presupposes that these choices will be made in a principled fashion. But which
principles, and based upon whose values? Traditionally, economic efficiency has been the
primary principle applied to forest commodities such as timber or grazing. In the market
context in which these commodities are traded, economic value (what an individual is
willing and able to sacrifice in order to obtain a good or service) is clearly appropriate.
Yet economists have recognized that many aspects of forest resources—wilderness,
wildlife, recreation, natural beauty, spiritual values—are not readily amenable to
traditional economic analysis. At the same time, however, the rapid growth in demand
for those non-market resources and the experiences associated with them that followed
World War II necessitated that they be included in forest management
0301–4797/96/120397

decision-making. Initial studies examined people’s direct use of natural environments
for purposes such as recreation. Then, in 1967, John Krutilla published an article
entitled “Conservation reconsidered” which is generally considered to be the original
expression of existence value. Krutilla’s paper, together with Weisbrod’s (1964) development of the concept of option value, suggested that many natural resources
produce benefits that extend well beyond their simple, direct use. The result has been
a creative extension of both economic concepts and measurement.
Conceptually, two categories of non-market economic values have been developed:
use values (including option value as a form of possible future use) apply to the benefits
a resource produces for those who actually use it, while non-use values concern benefits
received by those who do not use it. The distinction between use and non-use values
is not well defined and may not always be clear. Use values might include recreation,
aesthetic appreciation, and spiritual values. Non-use benefits have been subdivided into
existence value (the value people receive from simply knowing a resource exists),
altruism (the value derived from having other contemporaries use a resource) and
bequest value (preserving a resource for future generations). Use values have typically
been measured with travel-cost or hedonic models, recognizing that, although many of
these resources may be unpriced, they still have economic value because people make
sacrifices (the cost of travel) in order to use them. Non-use values are generally assessed
via contingent valuation.
Despite the conceptual growth, non-market values and valuation remain controversial. Questions remain about the validity of their use in benefit–cost analysis
(Milgrom, 1993), the degree to which they can be measured accurately, the meaning of
an individual expression of willingness to pay (Stevens et al., 1994), and their comparability with other measures of value. In this paper, we appraise these resource values
from a psychological perspective. We begin with a discussion of value as a concept in
social science, arguing that the various conceptions of value share the common idea
that values are guides to decision-making. We then present a model of the person as a
hierarchically ordered amalgam of biological, psychological and social factors and
locate values within this framework. This is followed by a discussion of the functional
nature of resource values. Finally, we raise questions about the validity of the concepts of
existence value and intrinsic value, both of great concern in contemporary environmental
ethics, and close with a general critique of the role of economics in resource policy and
analysis.

2. What is value?
“What is value?” is a deceptively simple question. Philosophers from Plato onward
have discussed various issues under headings such as the good, the right, the ultimate
end, obligation, virtue, morality, truth, aesthetics, etc. (Frankena, 1967). Although
Plato believed that all of these stemmed from the same root, over time they came to
be discussed separately, and the term “value” was restricted to mean the worth of
something (usually in an economic or quasi-economic sense), while “valuation” meant
an estimate of its worth. In the 19th century, however, philosophers such as Lotze and
Nietzsche returned to the Platonic tradition arguing for a general theory of value and
valuation that included economics, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence, education, and
perhaps even logic and epistemology (Frankena, 1967).
This conception of value matured in philosophy during the 1890s and subsequently

spread to psychology, the social sciences, the humanities and even to ordinary conversation. Each discipline interpreted value within its own metatheoretical structure,
heightening differences in meaning. This was paralleled by differences in measurement
techniques and methodologies which, in turn, derive their meaning from the metatheories. The result is almost certain confusion when one attempts to discuss value in
an interdisciplinary context. This confusion is exacerbated by a haze of closely related
concepts—how does a value differ from a preference, a motive, a goal, a policy, a want,
a desire, or an aspiration? There is much about this highly important concept that
remains unclear.
Brown (1984) has provided one of the best conceptual expositions of value as it
applies to resource management. He begins by distinguishing preference-based uses of
the term from non-preference related uses (the value of nitrogen in corn production,
the value of n in n2=4). Economic values are clearly preference related, as are other
social values. Brown defines a held value as an enduring conception of the preferable
and differentiates held values (honesty, freedom, beauty) from assigned values in which
the importance or worth of an object is expressed by implicit or explicit comparison
with other objects rather than by some absolute standard. Held values influence the
preference relationships that determine assigned values. Economic values are thus a
“species” within the “genus” of assigned value.
In this paper we take a slightly different approach. We define a value as a criterion
by which a state of affairs (an object or situation) is judged to have or afford the
property x, where x is instantiated by a pro or con predicate (e.g. good or bad, beautiful
or ugly) as opposed to a predicate that describes matters of fact (e.g. “green” or
“large”). Implicit in this definition is the notion of a valuer, the person according to
whom the state of affairs is good or bad, beautiful or ugly. In addition, the definition
embodies two other important elements. First, values serve as criteria that people use
to make judgments; that is, values specify the relationship between one thing and
another (as in Brown’s preference relationship). Second, values are differentiated from
facts. Both of these elements are important in the consideration of values and merit
further discussion.
3. Facts and values
During the 20th century, most natural resource management professions have prided
themselves on being scientifically based. That is, they have sought an objective basis
for management that is grounded in scientific fact. Values, for the most part, have been
left to shift for themselves, receiving implicit rather than explicit consideration in many
management actions, a situation that can become quickly problematic during the public
review process (Decker et al., 1991). Both facts and values are important in the decisionmaking process, so that we need to consider both values and the value/fact relationship
explicitly.
The relationship between facts and values has a venerable history stretching back
to the ancient Greeks. In modern (i.e. post-Renaissance) philosophy, however, it was
the Scottish philosopher David Hume who pointed out that, under standard systems
of logic, you cannot derive “ought” statements (values) from “is” statements (facts).
That is, facts (a description of “what is”) can never fully tell us what we ought to do;
sound decision-making requires a thorough knowledge of both the relevant facts and
values.
Although Hume’s point of logic still stands, it set off a controversy that has lasted

over 200 years. Today, it is virtually impossible to make any statement about the fact/
value relationship that is not controversial. Positions range from an extreme subjectivism
which insists that all observation is theory-laden and therefore cannot be divorced from
a human subjective element (a position that makes nearly everything a value) to an
extreme objectivism which holds that there is an objective truth to values which does
not depend upon our personal, idiosyncratic preferences but is objectively knowable
by all people across all cultures (a position that makes nearly everything a fact). It is
well beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate among these positions. For our
purpose, we are adopting a rather traditional, middle-of-the-road position on the fact/
value relationship. That is, facts are objective—they refer to the object and are considered
to be independent of any particular observer. Values, conversely, are subjective in that
they specify unique relationships between a particular person or group (the subject)
and a particular object. For example, the desk at which you work can be described
objectively with certain facts—length, width, height, number of drawers, and so forth.
Assuming we can agree on measurement, etc. these facts remain unchanged no matter
who is sitting at it. But whether or not it is a good desk depends upon its relationship
to you. That is, the value relationship is unique to the subject and can change across
individuals; the desk may be judged to be good or bad depending on the requirements
of the person sitting it. In this way, our value relationships link each of us as unique
individuals to the world in ways that are good or bad, right or wrong.
The fact/value dichotomy is particularly important because of the emphasis the
various natural resource professions have placed on fact-based problem solutions during
the 20th century. That is, when problems have arisen, the professions have generally
looked to scientific research (i.e. “factual” research in one or more of the sciences) to
supply the solution. We believe that this is no longer sufficient; many problems are as
much value-based as they are fact-based and we can no longer afford to ignore the
value dimensions of decision-making. Moreover, these value dimensions incorporate
more than economic values, so that we must attempt a more detailed explanation of
the role of value in behavior.

4. Behavior, systems, and value
Behavior can be construed in many ways. We prefer to think of behavior in a systems
context as co-ordinated patterns of responses “designed” to achieve some goal or fulfill
some function (Averill, 1992; Averill and More, 1993). What is important for our
present purpose is this notion of a goal or function. Small actions derive meaning
because they fulfill a function or functions within a larger system. Thus, a student may
tie her shoes in the morning because she wants to go to class. She wants to go to class
because she wants to pass her exam. She wants to pass her exam because she wants to
graduate. She wants to graduate because she wants to go to medical school to become
a doctor, and so on. In this way, the act of tying a shoe can be linked (at least partially)
to the distant goal of becoming a physician.
This example illustrates what we mean by systems of behavior. Such systems are
hierarchically organized from the simple to the complex and may also be distinguished
on the basis of the goals they serve: biological, psychological, or social. In fact, most
complex behavior is shaped by an amalgam of hierarchically arranged biological, social,
and psychological influences (Figure 1). Each of these systems is organized around an
ultimate goal or function within the individual. Within the individual, the ultimate
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function of biological systems is the maintenance of long-term health which is instantiated within the biological self as a set of subsidiary goals related to biological
functioning (e.g. sex, harm avoidance, attachment, etc.). For social systems, the ultimate
goal is the preservation of society, instantiated within the individual as a set of moral
precepts about right and wrong (something nearly equivalent to the Kantian concept
of duty). The well-socialized individual will share the dominant values of the culture,
defining behaviors that enhance the culture as good and those that detract from the
culture as bad. For psychological systems, the ultimate goal is the actualization of the
self—the reaching of one’s fullest potential as an individual.
These ultimate goals are broken down into subsidiary goals associated with subsystems of behavior, so that finishing a project at the office, running four miles without
stopping, or completing a high school degree can all be legitimate goals for an individual.
Within this framework, specific actions are linked to higher order goals through these
subsidiary goals and systems. Tying knots, unfurling sails, packing picnic lunches, etc.
may all be part of a day’s sailing activity—actions associated with (and partially
defining) the behavior of sailing. This day’s outing will be linked to a series of sailing
occasions, which is linked in turn to long-term plans regarding sailing (owning a bigger
boat, winning a particular race, retiring near a large lake, etc.). Finally, these longterm plans become part of a person’s definition of self—that she is a sailor!
Value as a concept plays several roles within this context. First, tangible goods and
services have value, in the sense of worth, because they enable us to fulfill functions,
because they contribute in some way to human flourishing (the optimal functioning of
the systems described above). In general, the more functions a particular item or service
fulfills, the more valuable it will be, and the more we will be willing to pay for it
(though not all functions are equal and some may be more inherently valuable than
others). The objective facts about a hammer, for instance, are attributes that are valued
because they are instrumental in helping the builder attain his goal. A jacket is valued
because it provides warmth (reflecting a goal in the biological hierarchy) and style
(potentially reflecting goals in both the social and psychological hierarchies).
Second, the market value of these tangibles, a form of assigned value, helps to
facilitate choice by establishing the standing of a particular object relative to others
(Brown, 1984; Brown and Peterson, 1993). We know the price of the jacket and the
hammer and we know how much we are willing to pay for each, given our goals and
priorities. Often, however, we are called upon to judge intangibles or semi-tangibles.
We may willingly pay higher prices for goods produced in our own country because
we are patriotic, or for grapes picked by union-workers because we believe migrant
farm-workers should not be exploited. At the higher levels of Figure 1’s hierarchies,
we are dealing almost exclusively with intangibles. We must often make decisions about
means and ends, about the validity or non-validity of an idea, about the beauty of a
painting or a landscape. Values such as honesty, integrity, aesthetic sensitivity and the
like—held values in Brown’s (1984) terminology—provide the standards by which we
make such decisions. One classification of such values might include rational, moral,
aesthetic, economic and spiritual values. Put most simply, rational values involve
standards for truth; moral values, standards for conduct; aesthetic values, standards
for appreciation; economic values, standards for choice among goods and services; and
spiritual values, standards for meaning. Values like these form the social self, the apex
of the social hierarchy in Figure 1. The self at this level is represented by a set of
propositions about who we are and how we relate to the world. As noted, the wellsocialized individual will have acquired the dominant values of the culture and will

tend to judge situations, events, goods and services, aesthetic objects and the like in a
way consistent with the values of the culture. However, these values may intersect in
multiple ways; a truth may be judged on aesthetic as well as rational grounds; aesthetic
values may be suborned to moral ends, etc. Thus, when making decisions, we may
construct a value hierarchy to suit the individual situation (Brown and Peterson, 1993).
5. The functional nature of resource values
Since Weisbrod (1964) first introduced the concept of option value, the non-market
values associated with natural resources have received considerable attention. As noted
these may be divided into two broad categories: use values, in which the benefits of a
non-marketed resource accrue directly to those who use it, and non-use values, in which
people who do not use the resource directly still derive some benefit from it and,
consequently, are willing to pay for its preservation. Non-use values include option
value, existence value, altruism and bequest value. These concepts are not well-defined.
For example, economic benefits might occur in any of the three hierarchies, depending
on the resource in question (Daum, 1993). Altruism and bequest value (which we
consider to be a specific form of altruism) are more specifically centred in the social
hierarchy. Altruism, kindness and generosity are all values encouraged in Western
cultures and, consequently, form the basis of social goals. A payment to ensure access
to the resource for others (either now or in the future) helps to fulfill these goals; it
enables the person to define herself as generous and caring.
The functions of existence value are less obvious. Most probably these functions
are multiple and related to a person’s self-concept. Recall that the self—the apex of
the three hierarchies in Figure 1—consists of a set of propositions about who we are
and our relationship to the world. In the psychological hierarchy, these propositions
are based upon knowledge structures acquired through past experience and unique to
the individual. In the social hierarchy, however, they consist primarily of held values.
I am honest; I am loyal; I am friendly, etc. When confronted with a question like “How
much would you be willing to protect Alaskan wolves?” a person’s answer may well
reflect this kind of proposition about the self: “I am willing to pay because I am the
kind of person who values nature and I have a moral commitment to do so”, etc.
Ultimately, then, all the foregoing values are based upon some notion of human
use in relation to human goals. These goals are many and varied and may be tied to
the resource in various ways. Even existence value can be construed as a form of use.
Therefore, a major conclusion we wish to draw is that the distinction between use and
non-use is not valid and has been responsible for great confusion in the literature. A
more appropriate distinction would be between on-site benefits (those a person receives
from being in close physical proximity to a resource) and off-site benefits. The key
point is that all these values are human use values and reflect human benefits and costs
regardless of where those benefits and costs are applied.
The distinction between use vs. non-use and on-site vs. off-site may seem a small
point to argue over, but it is crucial because it begins to raise doubts about the logical
foundations of existence value and intrinsic value. Specifically, when existence value is
divorced from the concept of non-use, its meaning changes. It may be that its meaning
is expanded to that everything a person knows of (including things she uses) has
existence value, or it may be contracted so that nothing has it. In either case, the
concept will have a far different meaning than we currently accord to it. This is even
more true of intrinsic value.

6. Intrinsic value
As concepts, non-market values certainly have face validity—they seem intuitively
obvious, and there are many examples of people’s concern for people, places, plants
and animals that they have neither seen nor ever expect to see. Many humanitarian
efforts are examples, as are efforts to save a wildlife species or to preserve a symbol
such as the Statue of Liberty. At a deeper level, however, it is possible to question the
construct validity of these values and hence their logical foundations. This is particularly
true for existence value and its first cousin, intrinsic value.
Intrinsic value, like the other resource values, has not been defined precisely. In its
most extreme and perhaps most common form, intrinsic value is the idea that objects
(things, species, individuals) have an inherent worth that makes them valuable in and
of themselves, regardless of any human benefit or cost they may generate. This is, of
course, quite close to the concept of existence value; the key difference is the emphasis
on human satisfaction that is tied to existence value. Proponents of intrinsic value
believe in the inherent worth of things, be they individuals, species or even nonbiological entities. This view is quite commonly held by environmental ethicists and
deep ecologists. Callicott (1992, p. 132), for example, proposes what he terms a
“truncated intrinsic value”: “What is worth arguing . . . is the proposition that nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole may be valued not only for what they
do for us, but . . . also for their own sakes as well.” These writers consider a notion of
value founded in human preference to be anthropocentric rather than biocentric or
ecocentric. Some even go so far as to assert that all living things are of equal value,
and the notion of intrinsic value may provide a basis for assigning rights to non-human
entities (cf. Stone, 1974; Nash, 1989).
Most economists probably would find the idea of value originating outside a human
context troubling, and we agree. Even so eminent a philosopher as Thomas Nagel (who
has a strong impulse to believe) has problems. “I don’t know how to establish whether
there are any such values. . . . The problem is to account for external values in a way
which avoids the implausible consequence that they retain their practical importance
even if no one will ever be able to respond to them. (So that if all sentient life is
destroyed, it will still be a good thing if the Frick Collection survives.)” (Nagel, 1986,
p. 153). Randall and Stoll (1983) attempt to bridge the gap between existence and
intrinsic values by defining what they term Q-altruism—the satisfaction derived from
knowing that the resource itself benefits from being preserved. However, the operative
term here is “satisfaction”, which keeps Q-altruism as a thoroughly anthropocentric
human value.
In our opinion, both existence value and intrinsic value suffer from serious difficulties
that become apparent upon close scrutiny. First, there is the problem of just what,
exactly, is being valued. As an example, consider Krutilla’s original statement about
existence value: “There are many people who obtain satisfaction from mere knowledge
that part of wilderness North America remains even though they would be appalled
by being exposed to it.” (Krutilla, 1967, p. 781). This really devolves into three
components: the thing itself (wilderness in this case), knowledge of the thing and the
satisfaction that people derive from the thing. We need to be quite clear about just
what is being valued here. Most economists would like to know the value of the thing
itself, and this may be where existence value can become confused with intrinsic value.
Knowledge of the thing is a separate issue. There are some people, for example, who
would argue that knowledge is good in and of itself. Clearly there are cases where the

thing itself may be bad (the smallpox virus, for example), but where knowledge about
the thing may be good. Finally, there is the problem of satisfaction. Satisfaction—we
would prefer the term pleasure—is an emotion. Pleasure (or satisfaction) is a state that
does not exist in isolation but, rather, comes with the fulfillment of some function or
the achievement of some goal. If a person is willing to pay to preserve a resource she
has never seen nor ever expects to see, and if she derives pleasure from that payment,
this pleasure occurs because a function has been fulfilled for her. By our own previous
definition, then, this places existence value squarely within the same category as use
values; it is simply a different form of use. This is quite different from the notion of
intrinsic value as described above. Moreover, the absence of a clear definition of
existence value enables it to be easily confused with intrinsic value, a confusion which
is, at least in our opinion, pervasive in the literature.
A more serious objection to existence and intrinsic values is that they are essentially
static concepts of value—they value the world the way the world is now. This is
especially true of intrinsic value. If everything living (and perhaps non-living things as
well) has value and a moral worth of its own, then it must be wrong to allow such
things to go out of existence.1 But this allows no room for a concept of competition,
either in a biological or an economic sense, or for growth, change or development.
There also may be little room for creativity. To create is also to destroy (or, to use a
less dramatic word, to transform). The potter who creates a magnificent vase from a
lump of clay does so only by destroying the lump; the carpenter who builds a house
does so at the expense of the original trees. To imbue the lump or the trees with value
and, subsequently, with rights could preclude their transformation into vases or houses.
To be fair, it might be argued that the vase or the house simply have greater value than
the lump or the trees, but this can only be true given anthropocentric human goals.
The relationship also holds within the biological and social orders: mammals could not
flourish until dinosaurs became extinct; and democracies could not emerge except at
the expense of feudalism. On a more individual level, when Beethoven wrote Eroica he
did so at the expense of the old aesthetic; when Lord Keynes wrote “The General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money”, he transformed economics. But suppose
the old aesthetic or the old economics was valuable in and of itself? What then? Indeed,
the relationship between creativity and transformation is consistent with our best
scientific laws: matter is neither created nor destroyed, it is only transformed. While
we could provide a much more detailed argument, the point is clear: a static conception
of value conflicts with our valuing transformation, growth, and creativity.
But the absence of a logical foundation for existence and intrinsic values presents
a further puzzle. Why, in the late 20th century, has it become so important to believe
in them, to believe in the inherent worth of wilderness, wild land, plants, or animals?
The seeds of these ideas are present in the writings of John Muir, and they received
their most elegant expression in Leopold’s (1953) classic essay “The Land Ethic” in
1
Thomas C. Brown (pers. comm. 1994) has noted that the idea of everything having existence value creates
additional confusion. Originally, the idea of existence value was probably meant to apply only to very
important things rather than to everything that exists. For example, it might apply to a species, but not to
a single member of a species that is not threatened. It seems more plausible, however, that there could be a
willingness to pay for every individual member of a species or a category. Brown recognizes that the existence
value of a single biological entity is much less than the existence value of a species (i.e. the marginal member
is less valuable the more members are there). Thus, Brown does not mind eating a lettuce plant so long as
there are many other such plants, but he would not eat the last one. This may be a personal preference,
however. By repute, gourmets will often pay substantial sums to be the person to consume the last of
something.

which he advocated the extension of rights to elements of the natural environment just
as they had been extended to women and minorities. But it has not been until late in
the 20th century that ideas about existence value or intrinsic value have become
influential in economic and ethical concepts, in policies such as the Endangered Species
Act and ecosystem management, and even in the popular mind and press. These ideas
may have come to the fore at this time because of a sense of limitation that comes in
a world rapidly approaching a population of 10 billion (Kennedy, 1993). People
(including intellectuals and economists) are worried. Do we need to apply the brakes
to this growth? Do we need additional pressure to regulate ourselves to avoid ecological
degradation? Can we avoid spiritual degradation when it is no longer possible to be
alone? We submit that these worries affect our concepts and that existence value and
intrinsic value are the intellectual manifestation of the web of ideas that surrounds
these issues. They may be more signs of the times than “true” scientific concepts.
This is supplemented by the notion that economics can be seen as a rather
conservative discipline overall, with concepts set up to find in favor of the status quo.
In psychology, it is a common finding that preference depends upon familiarity; that
is, we like (prefer, value) people, places, objects and situations with which we are
familiar. An even more robust finding, however, is that we dislike (fear, loathe, abhor,
disvalue, etc.) states of affairs with which we are unfamiliar. As the previous paragraph
suggested, the world is changing rapidly in surprising and often unpredictable ways.
Many people will find such change difficult. Is it surprising that, in this situation,
concepts such as existence value or intrinsic value, that emphasize the importance of
the status quo, should arise? To be sure, such concepts may, in some instances, sound
a clarion call to action—to preserve a species, to prevent an oil spill, to save a
wilderness—yet all these actions are ultimately in the service of preserving the world
as we know it. Surely these values are normative economic concepts that we have
treated as positive economics.
If existence and intrinsic values actually function to preserve the status quo, this
raises a further question regarding equity: Who do these concepts serve? Who is doing
well under the status quo? Studies of wilderness users (cf. Hendee et al., 1968), national
park visitors (Bultena and Field, 1978) and the environmental movement as a whole
(Harry et al., 1969) suggest that on-site users/organization members are drawn from a
social elite. The popular press also frequently portrays environmental regulations as
enacted at the expense of working class jobs. And yet, do the poor not benefit from
clean air and water? Can they not derive as much pleasure (benefit) as the wealthy
from simply knowing the Bengal tiger exists in the wild? Such questions highlight the
importance of the off-site benefits in determining equity, and they raise the stakes of
the validity issues substantially. The issue of applying income constraints (ability to
pay) is equally important. It is evident that we need much more work in this sensitive
area.
7. Conclusion: economics as the language of default and the Problem of the Flag
In this paper, we have argued that non-market resource values such as use, option
value, altruism and bequest values are legitimate expressions of value. Existence value
and intrinsic value seem more tenuous to us. Numerous surveys have demonstrated
that people are willing to pay to preserve the existence of a variety of resources from
wildlife to wilderness to the Statue of Liberty. Yet such empirical justification is not
enough; the concepts we use in science must be subject to logical proof as well as

empirical documentation. It might be argued that over the years people have believed
in witches, fairies, phlogiston and many other fanciful concepts. A man who is willing
to pay to protect himself from ghosts is a sovereign consumer, and economics has no
problem handling his decision. Why then should we not respect the results of surveys
of users or the general public with regard to their willingness to pay for existence? The
difficulty, of course, comes when we extend these concepts to the formation of public
policy. Here we are spending other people’s money rather than our own and, as was
suggested when it was revealed that astrology played a major role in the Reagan White
House, the public expects logical proof of concepts used in policy formation as well as
empirical documentation. To this end, we can no longer accept existence and intrinsic
values on the basis of face validity or survey results alone; much more work is needed
on their construct validity.
This concern about construct validity leads to a broader point about the validity
of valuing non-market resources in general. Decisions can be made on various grounds:
economic, moral, aesthetic or rational. In our society, however, economics has become
the language of default. We are unused to dealing with other grounds for decisions so,
when confronted with a difficult choice, we turn quite naturally to economics—surely
one of the most sophisticated and powerful tools for decision-making ever devised. Yet
this may lead us to extend economics to areas where it is ill-suited to serve, a disservice
both to the issue at hand and to economics.
To illustrate, let us pose what we have come to think of as the Problem of the Flag.
It is widely assumed by economists that the value of a commodity can be derived from
data on supply and demand (willingness to pay). Flags are one such commodity—they
are bought and sold in a market context and market data should be available if we
choose to seek it. Yet the flag is also something that people have died for. They expose
themselves to great risks to keep it from touching the ground. They salute or place
their hands over their hearts when it passes. In the U.S., when they wish to make an
exceptionally strong protest, they burn it—and the case goes almost immediately to
the Supreme Court where it is argued passionately by some of the finest lawyers in the
land. Given these behaviors and sentiments, is there any way that we can seriously
claim that the value of the flag is captured by market data?
“But,” you might object, “that’s because the flag is much more than just a piece of
colored bunting! What people are arguing over, dying for, is what the flag represents,
not just the piece of cloth.” Agreed. But the same can be said for Alaskan wolves, bald
eagles, grizzly bears, wilderness areas, tropical rain forests and the Statue of Liberty.
To just what extent can willingness-to-pay surveys capture the value of any of these
things? What is it that is actually being valued? Is there any way to know?
In conclusion, it is worth trying to regain a broad perspective. Non-marketed natural
resources produce benefits for society that extend well beyond their simple, direct onsite use. In attempting to evaluate these benefits, economists have created a number of
value concepts including use, option, existence, altruism and bequest. What we are
arguing over is how these concepts should be parsed, and whether or not they are
sufficiently valid to be used in benefit/cost analysis. From a psychological perspective,
we are able to make a good case for the validity of use, option, altruism and bequest
values because, in each of these cases, the concept can be closely linked to the furtherance
of human goals. Existence value is more tenuous because of its ties to intrinsic
value—value in the absence of any human function. This highlights the definitional
problem. Existence value is typically taken to include altruism and bequest values. But
if these were subtracted out, and any notion of intrinsic value was deliberately excluded,

would anything be left in the existence value category? This is crucial. We suspect that
existence value may include components other than altruism, bequest and intrinsic
values. The highest psychological concept is that of the self—a set of interconnected
propositions about who we are and our relationship to the world. Someone who defines
themself as the kind of a person who values nature will support this definition with a
complex web of actions and beliefs. The components of this web could range from site
visits to reading or watching television shows about nature to group membership to
payments in support of causes related to nature. Also included may be some sense of
a moral duty or commitment which could well form a component of existence value.
This possibility deserves further critical evaluation.
The appropriateness of using these concepts in benefit/cost analysis is a separate
issue. We have already questioned the validity of existence value because of its ties to
intrinsic value. But bequest value may also be suspect, depending upon the way in
which it is used. For example, it is perfectly acceptable for an individual to say “I value
wilderness and am willing to pay to preserve it for future generations.” This is a clear
expression of a personal value relationship and, as such, is quite legitimate. Often,
however, bequest value is used to speak on behalf of future generations, as in: “We
must save wilderness not for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren.” Such
a statement plays down the personal value and presumes to speak on behalf of future
generations and with all their moral authority. It is questionable for three reasons: (1)
the probability of future generations being born, while likely, is less than certain; (2)
future generations may be born to far greater wealth than the current generation
(admittedly this seems unlikely, but look what happened to Malthus’ predictions when
he was unable to envision the Industrial Revolution); and (3) it is easy to construct
situations in which future generations do not want what we think they ought to have.
Given the uncertainty of the future, we would be prudent to apply bequest value
cautiously.
In sum, sound decision-making requires a thorough knowledge of both relevant
facts and values. During the 20th century, the natural resource professions have
emphasized facts; it is now time that we examine the values involved much more
carefully and critically. Empirical documentation of these values is not sufficient; they
must be proven logically as well. The public has a right to expect that the concepts
used in policy formation be as sound as possible.
The authors are indebted to very thoughtful review comments from Thomas C. Brown and
Arthur Kuflik.
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